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1. INTRODUCTION
Hoppmann aims at providing a “theoretical background for applied argumentative
criticism” or, more in particular, at providing a “simplified taxonomy of critical
questions” that can be used for the evaluation of real life argumentative texts. The
main reason for undertaking such an endeavor, so he says, is the “undesirable
widening gap” between the theory of critical questions and the critical praxis for
which that theory has been designed. In order to develop a new taxonomy of critical
questions that serves practical needs, Hoppmann first presents an overview of
contemporary definitions of the concept. Second, he suggests a simplified taxonomy
consisting of three types and gives some concrete examples of each of them. Third,
he shows how the taxonomy may be of use in practice by analyzing a real life
argumentative text. In my commentary, I will address some issues concerning the
relation between the first and the second part of the paper and the broadness of
Hoppmann’s understanding of the concept of ‘critical questions’.
2. THE EXCLUSION OF SOME ACCOUNTS OF ‘OBJECTIONS’
In the first part of the paper, Hoppmann reviews a number of contemporary
definitions of the concept of ‘critical question’ and related concepts. Among the
latter he counts the concept of ‘objection’. For the purpose of developing a simplified
taxonomy of critical questions, so he announces, Hoppmann will only discuss
definitions in which ‘objection’ designates “something roughly equivalent to ‘critical
question’ (but in a different grammatical form)”. This means that, for instance,
Walton’s “procedural objections” and Govier’s “objections against the circumstances
of the arguer” are left out of the discussion. However, the taxonomy Hoppmann
presents in the second part of the paper does seem to contain criticisms of the type
just mentioned, namely under the heading of C.1 (general dialectical argumentation
process level questions). So my first comment is: “What is the reason for excluding
the accounts of ‘objections’ just mentioned from the discussion of the literature in
the first part of the paper?”
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3. THE PRAGMA-DIALECTICAL ACCOUNT OF CRITICAL QUESTIONS
Another issue regarding the relation between the first and the second part of the
paper arises from Hoppmann’s treatment of the pragma-dialectical account of
critical questions. Within pragma-dialectics, as he correctly observes, the concept of
critical questions is closely connected to the concept of argument schemes.
However, all of the groups of critical questions that are part of the taxonomy
presented in the second part of the paper can be related to pragma-dialectical
concepts that are not discussed in the first part of the paper. The distinction
between group A.1 (scheme-independent argument level questions) and group A.2
(scheme-dependent argument level questions) relates to the pragma-dialectical
distinction between criticisms raised against the propositional content of an
argument and criticisms raised against its justificatory force (see for instance
Hitchcock & Wagemans, 2011, pp. 193-197). The distinction between group B.1
(presumption-sufficiency questions) and group B.2 (counterargument sufficiency
questions) relates to the distinction between cumulative and complementary
argumentation (see Snoeck Henkemans, 1997, pp. 71-99). Group C.1 (general
dialectical process questions) does not only contain, as Hoppmann rightly remarks,
questions concerning the arguer’s compliance with procedural rules like the ones
listed in the pragma-dialectical model of a critical discussion, but also some
questions concerning the fulfillment of higher-order conditions that in the pragmadialectical view are considered as necessary but non-sufficient conditions for
resolving a difference of opinion on the merits (see Van Eemeren & Grootendorst
2004, pp. 36-37; 189-190). Finally, group C.2 (setting dependent special process
questions) contains questions related to the conventions that have to be taken into
account in order to analyze and evaluate argumentative discourse in
institutionalized contexts (see Van Eemeren, 2010, pp. 129-162). So my second
comment is: “Why is the discussion of the pragma-dialectical literature in the first
part of the paper restricted to the account of critical questions and to which other
accounts of critical questions do the groups in the taxonomy – except group A.2
(scheme-dependent argument level questions) – exactly relate?”
4. THE BROADNESS OF THE CONCEPT OF ‘CRITICAL QUESTIONS’
A final issue concerns the broadness of the concept of ‘critical questions’. Hoppmann
remarks that he is “aware that some people might prefer to restrict the label ‘critical
questions’ to only one particular segment of argumentative criticism.” He indicates
that the choice is an arbitrary one and that he wants to employ the label to
“questions that test what is critical’. However, indicating that a choice is arbitrary
does not exempt one from the dialectical obligation to defend the choice in view of
the terminological status quo. Reflecting on the fact that the term ‘argumentative
criticism’ is widely used as a generic term that covers various sorts of criticisms like
‘critical questions,’ ‘objections,’ and ‘fallacies,’ my third and last comment is: “What
is the reason for calling the taxonomy developed in the paper a ‘taxonomy of critical
questions’ rather than a ‘taxonomy of argumentative criticisms’?”
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